age, A Round Trip And A Wrong Key Refused
age and age-keygen on EL 10 from the GitHub release, pinned by a SHA-256 the role carries (the vendor publishes no checksum file), re-checked by the live test, which then makes two identities, encrypts to one, decrypts with it, and sees the other refused; the ciphertext carries the age-encryption.org/v1 header. Pinned. Original role, live-tested on Rocky Linux 10.
Verification
Live-testedReally deployed to a container sandbox, proven idempotent (a second run changes nothing), verified against the role’s assertions, then torn down.
Conformance
- Static validation (yamllint · ansible-lint)
Provenance
- SHA-256 checksum
- Signature (pending)
Functional
- Live-tested - applied, verified, destroyed
Last verified 2026-09-21 · podman 4.9.3 · ansible 2.21.4 · how we verify
Documentation
age
The age CLI (age) on EL 10 from the vendor's GitHub release,
checked against a SHA-256 pinned beside the version, installed as root's
binary in /usr/local/bin. Original role for EL 10, live-tested with
podman on Rocky Linux 10.
No package, and no checksum file to speak of. EL 10 carries no
age. age publishes no checksum file: each release asset carries a .proof, a Sigsum transparency-log proof that needs the sigsum tooling to check. This role pins the SHA-256 per architecture
beside the version, has Ansible's get_url refuse the asset unless it
matches, and the live test checksums the asset on disk again. A new
release is a new pair, on purpose.
Proven to do its work. The live test runs age -d -i /tmp/age-p/key.txt /tmp/age-p/msg.age and
expects "iacbazaar-age-secret" - the binary did the encryption work it is
installed for, on an input the test wrote.
A round trip, and a refusal. The live test makes two identities
with age-keygen, encrypts a message to the first recipient, decrypts it
with the first identity expecting the plaintext, and with the second
expecting a non-zero exit and no plaintext; the ciphertext starts with
age-encryption.org/v1. age is the key format the sops role in this
catalogue can use in place of a cloud KMS.
License
Commercial - IaC Bazaar EULA. (c) IaC Bazaar.
Usage code & full reference need an account
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- Variables
- Test
Related modules
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