CFSSL, A CA Minted And Read Back
cfssl and cfssljson on EL 10 from the GitHub release, each refused by Ansible's get_url unless its SHA-256 is the one in the vendor's checksums file, and re-checked by the live test, which mints a root CA from a CSR, writes it as PEM through cfssljson and reads the subject back with certinfo. Pinned; a newer release is a variable change. Original role, live-tested on Rocky Linux 10.
Verification
Live-testedReally deployed to a container sandbox, proven idempotent (a second run changes nothing), verified against the role’s assertions, then torn down.
Conformance
- Static validation (yamllint · ansible-lint)
Provenance
- SHA-256 checksum
- Signature (pending)
Functional
- Live-tested - applied, verified, destroyed
Last verified 2026-09-20 · podman 4.9.3 · ansible 2.21.4 · how we verify
Documentation
cfssl
Cloudflare cfssl on EL 10 from the vendor's release, checked against the
published SHA-256, pinned to a version, installed as root's binary
in /usr/local/bin. Original role for EL 10, live-tested with podman on
Rocky Linux 10.
No package worth the name. EL 10 carries no cfssl, and a
third-party repository is one more key to trust. This role takes the
release from cfssl.org, has Ansible's get_url refuse the asset unless
its SHA-256 is the published one, and the live test checks the asset on
disk against the same published value again.
Pinned. cfssl_version is what gets installed, kept in a directory
of its own so the checksum file and the asset it names stay together. A
newer release is a variable change and a run; the same version is
changed=0.
Proven to run. The live test runs cfssl gencert -initca /tmp/cfssl-p/csr.json and expects
""cert":" - the binary ran all the way to the point where it
needed something this host does not have.
A CA, minted and read back. The live test writes a CSR (ECDSA
P-256) and has cfssl gencert -initca mint a root CA; cfssljson -bare
turns the JSON into ca.pem and ca-key.pem, and cfssl certinfo reads
the subject and issuer back as the name that was asked for. The release
publishes every tool as a bare binary with one checksum file for all of
them; this role installs cfssl and cfssljson, both checked against
it.
License
Commercial - IaC Bazaar EULA. (c) IaC Bazaar.
Usage code & full reference need an account
The complete copy-paste usage, the full input/output reference, and operational notes are free with an account - shown here and bundled in the download. Sign in and this section fills in.
- Variables
- Test
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