A Private CA that Issues from the Intermediate with Roles Bound to Domains
Issuing from the root puts every leaf one signature from the root's compromise; a PKI role's defaults issue nothing until somebody reaches for allow_any_name, which issues for every hostname; and without AIA and CRL URLs a leaf is valid and unverifiable. A root that signs one intermediate, roles bound to allowed_domains, 30-day leaves under a 90-day ceiling, URLs on both mounts.
Verification
Static-verifiedPassed: validated and lint-clean (provider-schema-validated for AWS/Azure/GCP; Terraform-language lint elsewhere).
Conformance
- Static validation (fmt · validate · tflint)
- No applicable security policies for this provider
- Plan tests (mocked: validation rules · outputs)
Provenance
- SHA-256 checksum
- Signature (pending)
Functional
- Live test pending (no cloud run yet)
Last verified 2026-09-14 · how we verify
Use it from the registry
terraform · opentofumodule "pki_certificate_authority" {
source = "www.iac-bazaar.com/iac-bazaar/vault-pki-certificate-authority/multi"
version = "1.0.0"
}Needs a registry token from /account/tokens. The module itself is free; the account is what identifies you. Full setup: registry docs.
Inputs & outputs
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Documentation
vault-pki-certificate-authority
A private CA in Vault: an offline-style root, an issuing intermediate,
roles that issue only what they should, and URLs that make the chain
verifiable. Works with Terraform and OpenTofu (>= 1.6), vault
provider >= 5.0, < 6.0.
Issue from the intermediate, never the root. Two mounts; roles live on the intermediate.
Roles are bound to allowed_domains; allow_any_name is never set.
Leaf TTLs default to 30 days with a 90-day ceiling so a leaked certificate has a short life and rotation is routine.
AIA and CRL URLs are configured on both mounts.
Verification
Static validation runs tofu fmt, init, validate, tflint and checkov.
This module has not yet had a live test, so it is published as statically
validated with its live test pending and does not carry the live-tested mark.
Usage code & full reference need an account
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- Usage
Related modules
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Vault policies, auth backends, and secret engine configuration as code.