systemd Sandboxing, Measured Against The Job It Must Not Break

The scheduler on a stock EL host scores 9.6 UNSAFE and holds every capability the kernel has. This role writes a sandboxing drop-in and proves both halves: systemd's own exposure level came down, and the service still runs its jobs. The capability set that scores best is the one that stops cron working, and the README has the table. Original role, live-tested on Rocky Linux 10.

This is the operations reference: version drift, dependants and neighbours. For what the module provisions, its inputs and outputs, and how to buy it, see the catalogue entry.

ansibleMulti-cloud & platform-agnosticSecurity & Identityv1.0.0live-tested

Provider drift

This artifact declares no Terraform provider requirements, so there is nothing to drift. Provider freshness applies to Terraform and OpenTofu modules.

What depends on this

No reference architecture names this module, so changing it affects only configurations that reference it directly.

Nearest alternatives

Same cloud, same category. These are what you would weigh against it without changing provider.

AIDE, A Baseline And A Timer That Notices A Change Authelia SSO Portal, Secrets Kept Out Of The Config, Proven By A Login Bandit, A shell=True Call Found At High Severity Baseline Linux Hardening Boundary, Run To The Controller's Door Twice Dockle, A Root-User Finding With An Exit Code Gitleaks, A Planted Key Found Grype, Checked Against The Published Checksums

The same job on other clouds

This module has no cross-cloud peer set in the catalogue, so there is no portability comparison to draw.

Installing it

module "ansible_unit_hardening" {
  source  = "www.iac-bazaar.com/iac-bazaar/ansible-unit-hardening/any"
  version = "1.0.0"
}

A registry token is required for the download itself. Installing through the registry protocol has the two credential steps.