Authelia SSO Portal, Secrets Kept Out Of The Config, Proven By A Login
Authelia from the upstream release (sha256-verified) as a hardened system service on loopback with file users and sqlite; its secrets are generated once on the host and reach the service as AUTHELIA_*_FILE variables. The live test hashes a password with Authelia's hasher, logs in, sees a wrong password refused and an anonymous visitor sent to the portal. Original role, live-tested on Rocky 10.
Verification
Live-testedReally deployed to a container sandbox, proven idempotent (a second run changes nothing), verified against the role’s assertions, then torn down.
Conformance
- Static validation (yamllint · ansible-lint)
Provenance
- SHA-256 checksum
- Signature (pending)
Functional
- Live-tested - applied, verified, destroyed
Last verified 2026-09-20 · podman 4.9.3 · ansible 2.21.4 · how we verify
Documentation
authelia
Authelia from the upstream release (sha256-verified), as a hardened system service on loopback: an authentication and authorization portal for a reverse proxy, with a file user backend, sqlite storage and its secrets generated on the host. Original role for EL 10, live-tested with podman on Rocky Linux 10.
No package, so the checksum is the whole story. EL 10 carries no
authelia; Authelia ships a release with a checksum file beside it. The
role downloads both and has Ansible's get_url refuse the asset unless its
SHA-256 is the one in the vendor's file, then installs the binaries as
root's in /usr/local/bin, pinned by authelia_version.
A service account, a hardened unit, a loopback listener. authelia
is a system user with no shell that owns the data directory and nothing
else; the unit runs with NoNewPrivileges, PrivateTmp, ProtectHome and
ProtectSystem=strict. The listener is 127.0.0.1:9091 by default,
for a proxy that authenticates or a client on the same host; the live test
reads the listening sockets and expects loopback only.
Secrets the configuration never holds. The session secret, the
storage encryption key and the reset-password JWT secret are generated
once each on the host and handed to the service through AUTHELIA_*_FILE
variables in the unit; the same variables are given to
authelia config validate, which checks configuration.yml before it
lands and, without them, refuses it (that refusal was the control).
A user database that cannot be empty. Authelia's file backend refuses
users: {}, so the role writes a disabled placeholder until
authelia_users names real ones, each with a hash from
authelia crypto hash generate. The backend watches the file, which is
how the live test proves the portal: it hashes a throwaway password with
Authelia's own hasher, writes the user in place, logs in through
/api/firstfactor (200, status: OK), sees a wrong password refused
(401), and sees the forward-auth endpoint send an anonymous visitor to
https://auth.example.com (302 for a browser, 401 with the same Location
for an API client). Set authelia_domain to the cookie
domain your applications share and put the portal at auth. under it.
License
Commercial - IaC Bazaar EULA. (c) IaC Bazaar.
Usage code & full reference need an account
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- Variables
- Test
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