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Cloud Armor Security Policy (WAF)

Name: Cloud Armor Security Policy (WAF)
Brand: IaC Bazaar
SKU: gcp-cloud-armor
Availability: InStock

A global Cloud Armor WAF policy with preconfigured OWASP SQLi and XSS rules enforcing by default, an optional per-client rate limit, and custom IP allow/deny rules - attachable to many backends.

terraformGoogle Cloudgcp

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Part of: GCP Production Landing Zone

gcp-cloud-armorvizier v1.2.0

Verification

Live-tested

Really deployed to a cloud sandbox, verified against its outputs and assertions, then destroyed - with the teardown confirmed.

Conformance

Static validation (fmt · validate · tflint)
Security scan clean (Checkov)
Plan test superseded by live test

Provenance

SHA-256 checksum
Cosign signature

Functional

Live-tested - applied, verified, destroyed

Last verified 2026-06-30 · how we verify

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# 2. This module's Sigstore bundle
curl -o gcp-cloud-armor-1.0.0.sigstore.json \
  https://www.iac-bazaar.com/api/artifacts/gcp-cloud-armor/signature

# 3. Verify the tarball you downloaded
cosign verify-blob \
  --key cosign.pub \
  --bundle gcp-cloud-armor-1.0.0.sigstore.json \
  gcp-cloud-armor-1.0.0.tar.gz
# → Verified OK

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Use it from the registry

terraform · opentofu

module "cloud_armor" {
  source  = "www.iac-bazaar.com/iac-bazaar/gcp-cloud-armor/gcp"
  version = "1.0.0"
}

Needs a registry token from /account/tokens. The module itself is free; the account is what identifies you. Full setup: registry docs.

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Terraform module 1.0.0, live-tested on IaC Bazaar: [Cloud Armor Security Policy (WAF)](https://www.iac-bazaar.com/catalog/gcp-cloud-armor?utm_source=syndication&utm_medium=readme&utm_campaign=artifact)

```hcl
module "cloud_armor" {
  source  = "www.iac-bazaar.com/iac-bazaar/gcp-cloud-armor/gcp"
  version = "1.0.0"
}
```

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Inputs & outputs

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Documentation

gcp-cloud-armor

A standalone Cloud Armor security policy — a global WAF for HTTP(S) backend services — with a mandatory default rule and the preconfigured OWASP Core Rule Set WAF rules (SQL injection, cross-site scripting and the Log4j CVE-2021-44228 / log4shell cve-canary rule) wired in, plus an optional per-client rate-limit rule. The policy is not attached to any backend; reference its name from a backend service's security_policy field so one policy can guard many backends. Works with Terraform and OpenTofu (>= 1.6), Google provider >= 7.0, < 8.0.

Secure defaults:

SQLi, XSS and log4shell (cve-canary) preconfigured WAF rules on and enforcing (deny(403)), not in preview — flip waf_preview = true to tune sensitivity first.
Default rule allows traffic so attaching the policy never black-holes a backend; switch default_rule_action to a deny for a default-deny allowlist.
Adaptive Protection (L7 DDoS) is opt-in — it needs Cloud Armor Enterprise.

Upgrade notes

The Log4j / log4shell (cve-canary) rule is now enabled by default at priority 1002, enforcing waf_action (default deny(403)). If you are upgrading a policy that already has a rule at priority 1002, move that rule or set waf_log4j_priority to a free slot before applying. Set enable_waf_log4j = false to opt out of the rule entirely.

Requirements

Requirement	Version
Terraform / OpenTofu	`>= 1.6`
`hashicorp/google`	`>= 7.0, < 8.0`

The Compute Engine API (compute.googleapis.com) must be enabled in the project.

License

Commercial — IaC Bazaar EULA. © IaC Bazaar. Original work (not derived from a third-party module).

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Usage
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Outputs

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