Entra ID Workload Identity Baseline
App registrations, service principals, groups and federated credentials (OIDC for GitHub/Terraform) — the identity plumbing every Azure org rebuilds by hand.
Verification
Live-testedReally deployed, verified, idempotent and destroyed in a cloud sandbox.
Conformance
- Static validation (fmt · validate · tflint)
- Security scan: findings disclosed (Checkov)
- Plan tests (mocked: validation rules · outputs)
Provenance
- SHA-256 checksum
- Signature (pending)
Functional
- Live-tested — applied, verified, destroyed
Last verified 2026-06-29 · how we verify
Documentation
azure-entra-id-baseline
The Entra ID workload-identity plumbing every Azure org rebuilds by hand:
app registrations, their service principals, keyless federated OIDC
credentials (GitHub Actions, Terraform Cloud, Kubernetes), security groups,
and Azure RBAC role assignments — all from one composable module call. Works
with Terraform and OpenTofu (>= 1.6), hashicorp/azuread >= 3.0, < 4.0
plus hashicorp/azurerm >= 4.0, < 5.0 (for the resource-plane role grants).
Status: static-validated, live-test pending. Validated with
tofu fmt,tofu validate, andtflintagainst thehashicorp/azureadandhashicorp/azurermproviders. Not yet applied against a live tenant — creating app registrations needs Microsoft Graph admin consent (Application.ReadWrite.All,Group.ReadWrite.All) in a throwaway tenant, and no such sandbox exists yet, so it ships under live-test quarantine.
Design & secure defaults
- No secrets, ever. The module never creates a client secret or password.
External workloads federate via OIDC
(
azuread_application_federated_identity_credential) and present short-lived tokens — nothing exportable to leak, rotate, or commit by accident. - Deny-by-default app access. Service principals are created with
app_role_assignment_required = true: Entra issues tokens only to principals explicitly assigned to the app. Opt out per-app if you really mean to. - Least-privilege Graph permissions. No
required_resource_accessunless you declare it;Role(application) vsScope(delegated) is validated. - Implicit grant off. Web clients use auth-code + PKCE; legacy implicit token/ID-token issuance stays disabled.
- Owned by construction. Every app, service principal, and group requires at least one owner — ownerless directory objects are an operational hazard (no one can manage or clean them up). The deploying principal is a sane default.
- Security groups only. Groups are
security_enabled = true,mail_enabled = false— for RBAC/assignment, not mailboxes. - Duplicate-name guard.
prevent_duplicate_names = truestops a typo from silently adopting a stranger's existing registration. - No SP replication race. Role assignments to module-created service
principals set
skip_service_principal_aad_check = trueso a fresh apply does not fail while the SP propagates across Entra.
Requirements
| Requirement | Version |
|---|---|
| Terraform / OpenTofu | >= 1.6 |
hashicorp/azuread | >= 3.0, < 4.0 |
hashicorp/azurerm | >= 4.0, < 5.0 |
Verification
Static-validated (fmt, validate, tflint). Live apply/destroy testing pending a throwaway-tenant sandbox — see catalog status.
License
Commercial — LicenseRef-IaCBazaar-Commercial. © IaC Bazaar. Original work (not derived from a third-party module).
Usage code & full reference unlock after purchase
The complete copy-paste usage, the full input/output reference, and operational notes ship with your licence — shown here and bundled in the download.
- Usage
- Inputs
- Outputs
- Notes for integrators