A Graph Database that Has No Password
Neptune has no user, no password and no GRANT. Authorization is IAM and it defaults to OFF, so anything that can reach port 8182 can read every edge and drop the lot. IAM auth on, storage encrypted, and the audit log driven from one variable because its two halves live in different resources and either alone logs nothing.
Verification
Static-verifiedPassed: validated and lint-clean (provider-schema-validated for AWS/Azure/GCP; Terraform-language lint elsewhere).
Conformance
- Static validation (fmt · validate · tflint)
- Security scan clean (Checkov)
- Plan tests (mocked: validation rules · outputs)
Provenance
- SHA-256 checksum
- Signature (pending)
Functional
- Live test pending (no cloud run yet)
Last verified 2026-09-13 · how we verify
Use it from the registry
terraform · opentofumodule "neptune" {
source = "www.iac-bazaar.com/iac-bazaar/aws-neptune/aws"
version = "1.0.0"
}Needs a registry token from /account/tokens. The module itself is free; the account is what identifies you. Full setup: registry docs.
Inputs & outputs
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Documentation
aws-neptune
A Neptune graph cluster that requires an IAM identity to query, is encrypted,
and keeps a record of who queried it. Works with Terraform and OpenTofu
(>= 1.6), AWS provider >= 6.0, < 7.0.
Neptune has no password. No user, no password, no GRANT - nothing
resembling database authentication exists in the engine. Access control is IAM,
and iam_database_authentication_enabled defaults to false. With it off,
the only thing between a caller and the whole graph is whether they can reach
port 8182: anything inside the security group can read every edge, write new
ones, and drop the lot, and there is no second check behind the network. On
here, and iam_authentication_required is an output because it is the single
most useful thing to assert on for this service.
The audit log needs two settings in two different resources.
neptune_enable_audit_log in the cluster parameter group turns the log on
inside the engine; enable_cloudwatch_logs_exports on the cluster is what ships
it anywhere. Set one and you get no log and no error. One list - log_exports,
defaulting to ["audit"] - drives both, because either half alone is a
configuration that reports success and does nothing.
storage_encrypted defaults to false and cannot be changed afterwards.
Getting it wrong means a snapshot-and-restore migration later, so this module
hardcodes it to true rather than offering it as a choice. The key is yours
if you pass one; otherwise it is the AWS-managed aws/rds key, which is still
encryption but on a key you cannot scope with a policy or revoke.
Smaller things: neptune_enforce_ssl is set so a misconfigured client cannot
quietly fall back to plaintext; two instances by default, because a single
member turns a failure into a restore; and a precondition refuses the
combination skip_final_snapshot = false with no final_snapshot_identifier,
which otherwise fails at the very end of a destroy.
cluster_resource_id is an output because that - not the cluster name - is
what a neptune-db:connect policy is written against.
Verification
Static validation runs tofu fmt, init, validate, tflint and checkov.
This module has not yet had a live test, so it is published as statically
validated with its live test pending and does not carry the live-tested mark.
Usage code & full reference need an account
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- Usage
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