A Policy-Mode VPN Gateway with Its Own IKE and IPsec Policies Pinned to Strong Cryptography
An IBM Cloud VPC VPN gateway in policy mode with one connection to your on-premises gateway on IKEv2, with its own IKE and IPsec policies (AES-256, SHA-256, DH group 14) so IBM's auto-negotiation list never admits SHA-1 or a small group, the weak options refused by validation, IKEv1 by name, and dead peer detection that restarts the connection.
Verification
Static-verifiedPassed: validated and lint-clean (provider-schema-validated for AWS/Azure/GCP; Terraform-language lint elsewhere).
Conformance
- Static validation (fmt · validate · tflint)
- No applicable security policies for this provider
- Plan tests (mocked: validation rules · outputs)
Provenance
- SHA-256 checksum
- Signature (pending)
Functional
- Live test pending (no cloud run yet)
Last verified 2026-09-15 · how we verify
Use it from the registry
terraform · opentofumodule "vpn_gateway" {
source = "www.iac-bazaar.com/iac-bazaar/ibm-vpn-gateway/ibmcloud"
version = "1.0.0"
}Needs a registry token from /account/tokens. The module itself is free; the account is what identifies you. Full setup: registry docs.
Inputs & outputs
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Documentation
ibm-vpn-gateway
A site-to-site IPsec VPN on IBM Cloud VPC VPN for VPC. Works with Terraform and OpenTofu
(>= 1.6), ibm provider >= 1.60, < 3.0.
Its own IKE and IPsec policies, so auto-negotiation never admits the weak options; IKEv1 by name.
Policy-based between the CIDRs you name.
Dead peer detection restarts the connection.
Verification
Static validation runs tofu fmt, init, validate, tflint and checkov.
This module has not yet had a live test, so it is published as statically
validated with its live test pending and does not carry the live-tested mark.
Usage code & full reference need an account
The complete copy-paste usage, the full input/output reference, and operational notes are free with an account - shown here and bundled in the download. Sign in and this section fills in.
- Usage
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