Shell Access with No Bastion, and a Transcript
Session Manager works with no configuration and records nothing: CloudTrail holds StartSession, not the commands. This builds the session document that turns logging on, and refuses to build one with no destination unless you say so.
Verification
Static-verifiedPassed: validated and lint-clean (provider-schema-validated for AWS/Azure/GCP; Terraform-language lint elsewhere).
Conformance
- Static validation (fmt · validate · tflint)
- Security scan clean (Checkov)
- Plan tests (mocked: validation rules · outputs)
Provenance
- SHA-256 checksum
- Signature (pending)
Functional
- Live test pending (no cloud run yet)
Last verified 2026-09-12 · how we verify
Use it from the registry
terraform · opentofumodule "ssm_session_manager" {
source = "www.iac-bazaar.com/iac-bazaar/aws-ssm-session-manager/aws"
version = "1.0.0"
}Needs a registry token from /account/tokens. The module itself is free; the account is what identifies you. Full setup: registry docs.
Inputs & outputs
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Documentation
aws-ssm-session-manager
Shell access to an instance with no inbound port, no SSH key and no bastion -
and the logging that makes it auditable rather than merely convenient. Works
with Terraform and OpenTofu (>= 1.6), AWS provider >= 6.0, < 7.0.
The default is an unrecorded shell. Session Manager works with no
configuration at all, and in that state nothing anywhere records what was typed:
CloudTrail has StartSession and StopSession, not the commands. So the
interesting part of this module is not the access, which is free - it is the
session document that turns logging on, and the precondition that refuses to
build one without a destination unless accept_unlogged_sessions says you meant
it.
The document name is not cosmetic. Session Manager reads account preferences
from a document called exactly SSM-SessionManagerRunShell. A document with any
other name is a document nobody reads, and everything in it is settings that
look applied and are not. The name is fixed in the module for that reason.
Encryption has two independent switches, and confusing them is how transcripts end up in the clear:
kms_key_arnencrypts the session - the keystrokes in flight, beyond the TLS already thereencrypt_logsencrypts the transcript at its destination
Setting a log destination and leaving encrypt_logs false writes the transcript
in plain text, which a precondition refuses unless accept_plaintext_logs says
the bucket's own encryption is handling it.
Two more things it gets right:
AmazonSSMManagedInstanceCoredoes not grant the permissions to write the session log. An instance with only that policy connects fine and silently produces no transcript - the failure that looks like success. The module adds the S3, CloudWatch and KMS permissions scoped to the destinations you gave it- The operator policy is scoped by instance tag and to this document.
ssm:StartSessionon"*"is administrator access to the whole estate through a door that leaves no key behind
run_as_user is offered because ssm-user is created by the agent and added to
sudoers, so every operator's actions resolve to the same OS account.
Verification
Static validation runs tofu fmt, init, validate, tflint and checkov.
This module has not yet had a live test, so it is published as statically
validated with its live test pending and does not carry the live-tested mark.
Usage code & full reference need an account
The complete copy-paste usage, the full input/output reference, and operational notes are free with an account - shown here and bundled in the download. Sign in and this section fills in.
- Usage
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