A KMS Secret Encrypted with Your Key, with a Recovery Window Before It Is Gone
A secret in Alibaba Cloud KMS Secrets Manager whose value is a sensitive variable supplied at apply time and never output, encrypted with a KMS key of yours rather than the service key (the service key by name), with a version label that rotates the value when changed and a recovery window of up to thirty days before a deleted secret is gone; force deletion is accepted by name.
Verification
Static-verifiedPassed: validated and lint-clean (provider-schema-validated for AWS/Azure/GCP; Terraform-language lint elsewhere).
Conformance
- Static validation (fmt · validate · tflint)
- No applicable security policies for this provider
- Plan tests (mocked: validation rules · outputs)
Provenance
- SHA-256 checksum
- Signature (pending)
Functional
- Live test pending (no cloud run yet)
Last verified 2026-09-14 · how we verify
Use it from the registry
terraform · opentofumodule "kms_secret" {
source = "www.iac-bazaar.com/iac-bazaar/alicloud-kms-secret/alicloud"
version = "1.0.0"
}Needs a registry token from /account/tokens. The module itself is free; the account is what identifies you. Full setup: registry docs.
Inputs & outputs
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Documentation
alicloud-kms-secret
A secret in Alibaba Cloud KMS Secrets Manager, encrypted with your
key, with a recovery window. Works with Terraform and OpenTofu
(>= 1.6), alicloud provider >= 1.0, < 2.0.
The value is a secret in state; a sensitive variable, never output.
The service key is not your key; yours here, the service key by name.
Deletion is scheduled, not done; force deletion by name.
Verification
Static validation runs tofu fmt, init, validate, tflint and checkov.
This module has not yet had a live test, so it is published as statically
validated with its live test pending and does not carry the live-tested mark.
Usage code & full reference need an account
The complete copy-paste usage, the full input/output reference, and operational notes are free with an account - shown here and bundled in the download. Sign in and this section fills in.
- Usage
Related modules
alicloud-kms-key
automatic_rotation defaults to Disabled, so today's key material encrypts everything for the life of the account; a key scheduled for deletion is gone after its window with everything encrypted under it; and deletion_protection, the switch that refuses the schedule, defaults to off. Rotation on at your interval, deletion protection on and off by name, the maximum pending window, and an alias.
huawei-csms-secret
A secret in Huawei Cloud Secrets Manager whose value is a sensitive variable supplied at apply time and never output, encrypted with a KMS key of yours rather than the account's default CSMS key (the default by name), with an expiry after which CSMS flags it (none by name) and event subscriptions that notice version changes and expiry.
exoscale-kms-key
A key is zonal unless multi-zone, which is the surprise at the first cross-zone restore; and the service has no automatic rotation setting and no flag that refuses deletion, so a key is deleted in one call. Multi-zone unless told otherwise, and outputs that say rotation and deletion protection are not available, so nothing downstream assumes a control that is not there.
tencent-kms-key
key_rotation_enabled defaults to false, so today's key material encrypts everything for the life of the account; and a key scheduled for deletion is gone after its window with everything encrypted under it, on a service that has no flag to refuse the schedule. Rotation on for symmetric keys, a 30-day window (the maximum), and an output that says no deletion-protection flag exists.
huawei-kms-key
rotation_enabled defaults to false, so today's key material encrypts everything for the life of the account; and a key scheduled for deletion is gone after its pending window with everything encrypted under it, on a service with no flag to refuse the schedule. Rotation on at your interval, a 30-day window, and an output that says no deletion-protection flag exists.
vault-kv-engine
KV v1 overwrites in place, so a bad write is the end of the previous secret; cas_required defaults to false, so two writers that read the same version both succeed and the second silently replaces the first; and version history is unbounded by default. v2 always, check-and-set on (off by name), versions bounded by count and age, the mount's lease ceilings set rather than inherited.